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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Given that Plaintiff and Appellee ZB, N.A. d/b/a Zions First National Bank 
(“Zions”) undisputedly loaned Defendant and Appellant Shayne D. Crapo (“Crapo”) 
$250,000, and that Crapo failed to repay that loan, did Zions’ issuance of a mandatory tax 
report (Form 1099-C) raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude judgment in favor 
of Zions?   
This Court reviews the grant of a summary judgment motion for correctness.  Ross 
v. Epic Eng’g, PC, 2013 UT App 136, ¶ 13, 307 P.3d 576.  “Although [courts] consider 
the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, to defeat a motion for 
summary judgment, any alleged issue of fact must be material.”  Overstock.com, Inc. v. 
SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ¶ 12, 192 P.3d 858.  Moreover, this Court may affirm 
the judgment below on any ground apparent from the record.  Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 
58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations are determinative (in part) 
of this appeal: 
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1. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-11 
(a) Reporting requirement—(1) In general. . . . [A]ny 
applicable entity . . . that discharges an indebtedness of any 
person . . . of at least $600 during a calendar year must file an 
information return on Form 1099–C with the Internal 
Revenue Service. Solely for purposes of the reporting 
requirements of section 6050P and this section, a discharge of 
indebtedness is deemed to have occurred . . . if and only if 
there has occurred an identifiable event described in 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, whether or not an actual 
discharge of indebtedness has occurred on or before the date 
on which the identifiable event has occurred.  
* * * 
(2) Identifiable events—(i) In general. An identifiable 
event is— 
(A) A discharge of indebtedness under title 11 of the 
United States Code (bankruptcy); 
(B) A cancellation or extinguishment of an 
indebtedness that renders a debt unenforceable in a 
receivership, foreclosure, or similar proceeding in a federal or 
State court . . . ; 
(C) A cancellation or extinguishment of an 
indebtedness upon the expiration of the statute of limitations 
for collection of an indebtedness . . . ; 
(D) A cancellation or extinguishment of an 
indebtedness pursuant to an election of foreclosure remedies 
by a creditor that statutorily extinguishes or bars the creditor’s 
right to pursue collection of the indebtedness; 
(E) A cancellation or extinguishment of an 
indebtedness that renders a debt unenforceable pursuant to a 
probate or similar proceeding; 
                                
1 A copy of this provision is attached as Addendum 1. 
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(F) A discharge of indebtedness pursuant to an 
agreement between an applicable entity and a debtor to 
discharge indebtedness at less than full consideration; 
(G) A discharge of indebtedness pursuant to a decision 
by the creditor, or the application of a defined policy of the 
creditor, to discontinue collection activity and discharge debt; 
or 
(H) In the case of an entity described in section 
6050P(c)(2)(A) through (C), the expiration of the non-
payment testing period, as described in § 1.6050P–
1(b)(2)(iv). 
* * * 
(iv) Expiration of non-payment testing period. There is 
a rebuttable presumption that an identifiable event under 
paragraph (b)(2)(i)(H) of this section has occurred during a 
calendar year if a creditor has not received a payment on an 
indebtedness at any time during a testing period (as defined in 
this paragraph (b)(2)(iv)) ending at the close of the year. The 
testing period is a 36–month period increased by the number 
of calendar months during all or part of which the creditor 
was precluded from engaging in collection activity by a stay 
in bankruptcy or similar bar under state or local law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.  On or about December 29, 2006, 
Crapo executed a Home Equity Line Credit Agreement and Disclosure (the “Note”), 
under which Crapo agreed to pay all credit advances.2  That same day, Crapo drew upon 
the full amount of the line of credit, and Zions disbursed to Crapo the $250,000 in loan 
proceeds.3   
                                
2 R. at 233.  A copy of the Note (R. at 284–292) is included as Addendum 2. 
3 R. at 235. 
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The term of the Note was thirty (30) years, with monthly interest payments being 
due during the first ten years, and all principal and interest being amortized over the 
following twenty years.4  In the Note, Crapo expressly agreed that delay in enforcement 
would not constitute a waiver of Zions’ right to enforce the Note: 
Delay in Enforcement.  We may delay or waive the 
enforcement of any of our rights under this Agreement 
without losing that right or any other right.  If we delay or 
waive our rights, we may enforce that right at any time in the 
future without advance notice.  For example, not terminating 
your account for non-payment will not be a waiver of our 
right to terminate your account in the future if you have not 
paid.5 
Crapo made payments on the Note sufficient to cover the accruing interest until 
September 2010, after which he defaulted.6  On or about October 20, 2010, Zions 
exercised its right to accelerate the entire balance of the Note.7  Crapo subsequently 
failed to make any further payments on the Note.8  On or about January 6, 2011, Zions 
created an internal “Charge Off Request,” in which a Zions representative requested that 
Crapo’s loan balance “be charged off due to the lack of collateral and transferred to [the] 
Recovery Department for further collection efforts.”9  Crapo did not indicate that he ever 
received or relied on the Charge Off Request.10 
                                
4 Note at 1 (R. at 284; Addendum 2). 
5 Note at 5 (R. at 288; Addendum 2). 
6 R. at 235. 
7 R. at 235. 
8 R. at 236. 
9 R. at 384, 428.  While the copy of the document included in the record is illegible, the 
relevant language was quoted in the district court’s ruling.  Ruling at 10 (R. at 563; 
Addendum 5).  Additionally, the relevant language is quoted in the Brief of Appellant at 
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By December 31, 2013, Crapo had not made any payments in the preceding 36-
month period.11  Accordingly, in January 2014, as mandated by IRS regulations, Zions 
issued a Form 1099-C (the “1099-C”) to Crapo.12  The Form 1099-C contains several 
boxes of information, one of which is box 6, which requires the issuer to input an 
“identifiable event code” explaining the reason for issuance of the form.13  There are 
eight different codes available in the form, including several options indicating an actual 
discharge and one option indicating a debtor’s failure to make payments.14  In the 1099-C 
issued to Crapo, Zions indicated “H” in box 6 as the “identifiable event code.”15  The 
“Instructions for Debtor” section of the 1099-C explains that option “H” denotes the 
“Expiration of nonpayment testing period.”16  The IRS publication entitled Instructions 
for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C further explain code “H” as follows: “This event occurs 
when the creditor has not received a payment on the debt during the testing period. The 
testing period is a 36-month period ending on December 31, plus any time when the 
                                                                                                     
4, ¶ 7.  Further, Crapo’s Addendum 2 includes both the illegible copy included in the 
record, and a legible copy that was not in the record.  Zions stipulates that the legible 
copy included as part of Crapo’s Addendum 2 may be considered part of the record on 
appeal.  Cf. UTAH R. APP. P. 11(h) (“If anything material to either party . . . is omitted 
from the record by error [or] by accident . . . the parties by stipulation . . . may direct that 
the omission or misstatement be corrected.”). 
10 R. at 384–385, 402–403. 
11 R. at 236. 
12 R. at 236.  A copy of the 1099-C (R. at 308) is included as Addendum 3. 
13 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 236. 
14 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 462. 
15 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 462. 
16 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 236. 
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creditor was precluded from collection activity by a stay in bankruptcy or similar bar 
under state or local law.”17   
Box 4 of the 1099-C is where the creditor indicates a “debt description.”18  Box 4 
of the 1099-C issued to Crapo contains the phrase “FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 YRS NO 
PAYMENT.”19  This phrase appears in box 4 of the 1099-C not because of an actual 
forgiveness or discharge, but simply as another description of the expiration of the 36-
month testing period without receipt of any payment.20 
In issuing the 1099-C, Zions had no intent to waive its claims against Crapo and 
did not intend the 1099-C to reflect any agreements or discussions with Crapo.21  Rather, 
the 1099-C was issued solely for purposes of complying with applicable tax regulations 
and was generated through automatic processes in place to ensure compliance with such 
regulations.22  Zions has never at any time taken any action to grant an actual release, 
forgiveness, or discharge of Crapo’s debt.23  Further, there is no agreement, signed 
writing, or other indication in the books and records of Zions reflecting an actual release, 
forgiveness, or discharge of Crapo’s debt to Zions.24 As a matter of policy, Zions does 
                                
17 See Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C at 4 (R. at 313). A copy of the 
Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C (R. at 310–315) is included as Addendum 4. 
18 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3). 
19 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 463. 
20 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 463. 
21 R. at 236, 462. 
22 R. at 236, 462. 
23 R. at 463. 
24 R. at 463. 
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not forgive, release, or discharge debts for reasons other than full payment except under 
exceptional circumstances, such as where a borrower is discharged in bankruptcy.25   
 Citing language in the 1099-C, Crapo claims that a Form 1099-C is issued “when 
‘an applicable financial entity (a lender) has discharged (cancelled or forgiven) a debt’ 
owed by the person who receives the form.”26  However, Crapo’s statement 
conspicuously omits (without even using an ellipsis) the remainder of the quoted 
sentence, which states “. . . or because an identifiable event has occurred that either is or 
is deemed to be a discharge of a debt of $600 or more.”27 As noted above, one of the 
eight “identifiable events” that leads to the issuance of a Form 1099-C is the debtor’s 
failure to make a payment for 36 months.28  Crapo also incorrectly claims that the 1099-
C provided that “he was ‘required to include the discharged amount in [his] income’ and 
that a failure to do so would result in ‘a negligence penalty or other sanction.’”29  
However, Crapo’s description again misleadingly characterizes the 1099-C, which states: 
“If an identifiable event has occurred but the debt has not actually been discharged, then 
include any discharged debt in your income in the year that it is actually discharged . . .,” 
                                
25 R. at 463. 
26 Brief of Appellant at 4, ¶ 10. 
27 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3) (emphasis added); R. at 462.  Crapo included the 
same omission in his summary judgment opposition memorandum (R. at 385, ¶ 7), and 
Zions pointed out Crapo’s omission in its reply memorandum (R. at 458). 
28 Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C at 4 (R. at 313; Addendum 4). 
29 Brief of Appellant at 4, ¶ 12. 
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and that a penalty may be imposed only “if taxable income results from this transaction 
and the IRS determines that it has not been reported.”30 
In addition to Crapo’s incorrect statements regarding the 1099-C, Crapo also 
overstates the facts in the record concerning his reliance on the 1099-C.  Contrary to 
Crapo’s suggestion, there is no admissible record evidence that he actually reported the 
discharged debt, that his tax burden was increased, or that Zions’ tax burden was 
decreased.31  Crapo’s claim that he reported the discharged income on his 2013 tax return 
relies wholly upon his own declaration.32  Zions specifically objected to Crapo’s 
declaration testimony based upon the fact that Crapo had neither attached a copy of his 
2013 tax return nor even produced that return as part of his disclosures, and was thus 
precluded from referencing the substance of his 2013 tax return by Utah Rule of 
Evidence 1002.33 
Ultimately, the district court found no genuine issue of material fact and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Zions.34  In addressing the 1099-C generally, the district 
court explained: 
The regulation and the Form are both clear and 
unequivocal – the issuance of the 1099-C signifies either an 
                                
30 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3) (emphasis added).  Again, Crapo included the same 
misleading statement in his opposition memorandum (R. at 385, ¶ 10), and Zions pointed 
out the problem in its reply memorandum (R. at 459). 
31 Brief of Appellant at 4–5, ¶¶ 13–17. 
32 See Brief of Appellant at 4–5, ¶¶ 13, 17; R. at 403. 
33 R. at 460.   
34 See Order Granting the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Ruling”) (R. at 
554–570).  A copy of the Ruling is included as Addendum 5. 
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actual discharge or some other identifiable event.  It is a 
“means of satisfying a reporting obligation to the IRS; it is 
not a means of accomplishing an actual discharge of debt.”  
The Form does not, in and of itself, effectuate a discharge, 
nor does it constitute evidence of a discharge, especially in 
this case where the form made clear that the reason for the 
issuance of the Form was due to “identifiable Event ‘H’,” 
which signified the “expiration of the non-payment testing 
period” and not an actual discharge, cancellation or 
extinguishment.35 
Having concluded that the 1099-C, in itself, did not constitute a discharge or evidence of 
a discharge, the district court carefully considered the other evidence raised by Crapo, 
including the written-in language in the 1099-C (“FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 YRS NO 
PAYMENT”), the fact that the debt was charged off, and the alleged delay in 
collection.36  The district court also specifically considered and rejected Crapo’s estoppel 
defense, holding that Crapo had not raised a genuine issue of fact as to any of the 
elements of estoppel.37  The district court subsequently entered its final judgment, and 
this appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Zions’ on its 
claim for breach of contract.  There is no dispute that Crapo obtained a loan from Zions 
and failed to repay that loan.  The district court properly rejected Crapo’s arguments that 
the 1099-C evidenced an actual discharge or constituted a basis for estopping Zions from 
enforcing the Note.  A Form 1099-C is a tax reporting tool that a lender is required to 
                                
35 Ruling at 6 (R. at 559; Addendum 5) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
36 Ruling at 7–12 (R. at 560 to 565; Addendum 5).  
37 Ruling at 13–15 (R. at 566–568; Addendum 5). 
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issue upon the occurrence of an “identifiable event.”  Several identifiable events are 
based upon an actual discharge of a debt, whether by agreement, bankruptcy, or 
otherwise.  However, the identifiable event in Crapo’s 1099-C was Crapo’s failure to 
make payments for 36 consecutive months (also referred to as the “nonpayment testing 
period”), which is not an actual discharge of debt.   
Crapo focuses on three facts that he argues should have precluded summary 
judgment in favor of Zions.  First, Crapo emphasizes that the 1099-C contains the words 
“FORGIVEN DEBT AMT.”  What Crapo fails to address is that those words are 
followed immediately by “3 YRS NO PAYMENT.”  Moreover, the 1099-C expressly 
identifies expiration of the nonpayment testing period as the reason for issuance.  For 
those reasons, the 1099-C did not give rise to genuine issues of material fact. 
Crapo also argues that Zions’ alleged delay in enforcing the Note raised an issue 
of fact to preclude summary judgment.  However, Crapo fails to establish that Zions had 
a duty to enforce the Note any sooner than it did.  Moreover, Crapo expressly agreed in 
the Note that a delay in enforcement would not in any way constitute a bar to 
enforcement.  As such, any delay was neither inconsistent with the enforceability of the 
Note nor evidence of an actual discharge. 
The third fact on which Crapo focuses is the Charge Off Request.  The term 
“charge off” is used to describe a bank’s regulatory and accounting obligation to remove 
a debt from its balance sheet, typically due to lack of payment or doubt as to the 
collectability of the debt.  As a result of a charge of, a bank is entitled to a tax deduction 
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claimed on bad debt.  If a lender charges off a debt but subsequently recovers the debt, 
the recovery must be reported as income.  The fact that a debt is charged off has no 
impact on a debtor’s obligation to repay the debt.  In this case, Zions’ Charge Off 
Request expressly indicated that Zions intended to continue pursuing Crapo’s debt.  
Moreover, Crapo did not allege that he even received, let alone relied upon the Charge 
Off Request.    Even if Crapo had relied on the Charge Off Request, there is no question 
or ambiguity as to Zions’ intention to continue collection of the loan.  For the foregoing 
reasons, the Charge Off Request did not constitute a genuine issue of material fact. 
On appeal, Crapo has woven these three facts into two legal theories.  First, Crapo 
argues that Zions was equitably estopped from enforcing the Note because he relied on 
Zions’ inconsistent conduct in reporting the loan amount on his 2013 tax return.  Second, 
Crapo argues that he raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Zions, in fact, 
discharged his liability on the Note.   
Crapo’s estoppel defense fails on several grounds.  To begin with, Crapo failed to 
present evidence to support his estoppel defense.  Based on Crapo’s declaration, the only 
information on which Crapo relied was the instructions portion of the 1099-C (which told 
Crapo to report a discharge only in the event of an actual discharge).  There was no 
evidence that Crapo relied on the “FORGIVEN DEBT” language, the alleged delay in 
collection, or the Charge Off Request.  Similarly, Crapo failed to present any admissible 
evidence that he actually reported the debt or paid additional taxes, or otherwise suffered 
any injury as a result of Zions’ conduct.  Crapo certainly did not present any evidence of 
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the amount of additional taxes he purportedly paid.  In any event, none of the conduct 
cited by Crapo was inconsistent with Zions’ intent to enforce the Note. 
The facts raised by Crapo also did not constitute or evidence an actual discharge of 
debt.  Again, the 1099-C was a required tax document that expressly stated it was issued 
due to Crapo’s failure to make payments.  The purported delay in enforcing the Note was 
immaterial because Crapo expressly agreed that delay was not waiver, and because Zions 
otherwise bore no duty to bring an action on the Note any sooner than it did.  Finally, the 
Charge Off Request was immaterial to an actual discharge because it did not evidence an 
intent to discharge Crapo’s debut – to the contrary, it expressly stated Zions’ continued 
intent to enforce the Note.  Moreover, Crapo has cited no authority to support the claim 
that a charge off impacts a debtor’s obligation to pay. 
In summary, Crapo received a loan and failed to repay it.  Zions’ conduct was 
consistent with applicable banking and tax regulations and did not give rise to an actual 
discharge of debt.  The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Zions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CRAPO DID NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
WITH RESPECT TO AN ESTOPPEL DEFENSE. 
Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense that requires its proponent to prove 
three elements:  
(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis 
of the first party’s statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from 
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allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969–70 (Utah 1989).  However, 
estoppel is a “disfavored remedy” that should be “applied rarely,” and it is generally 
“reserved for instances of wrongdoing by the estopped party.”  Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, ¶ 40, 258 P.3d 539 (citations omitted); see also 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 1088 (“We typically 
only apply equitable estoppel to circumstances involving misrepresentations of past or 
present fact, along with the other necessary factors.”). 
 In view of Crapo’s failure to set forth specific, relevant facts to support his claim 
of estoppel, as set forth more fully below, the Court should affirm the district court’s 
conclusion that Crapo “cannot prove any of these elements [of equitable estoppel].”38  
Inasmuch as each one of these elements must be established by Crapo, the Court should 
affirm the district court if it finds that Crapo failed to provide relevant, admissible 
evidence for any of one of these elements. 
A. The 1099-C Was Not Evidence of Inconsistent Conduct. 
 Crapo’s estoppel argument focuses on the various aspects of the 1099-C and the 
attendant circumstances.  Therefore, it bears emphasis to recognize that a Form 1099-C is 
a reporting requirement and not a document intended to alter the legal relationship 
between debtors and creditors. 
                                
38 Ruling at 14 (R. at 567; Addendum 5). 
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Under IRS regulations, financial institutions must issue a 1099-C when a 
“discharge” occurs.  26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P-1.  However, these requirements specifically 
limit the effect of a “discharge” by defining that term as follows: “Solely for purposes of 
the reporting requirements of section 6050P and this section, a discharge of 
indebtedness is deemed to have occurred . . . if and only if there has occurred an 
identifiable event described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, whether or not an actual 
discharge of actual indebtedness has occurred . . . .”  Id. § 1.6050P-1(a) (emphasis 
added).  And, a covered entity must issue a Form 1099-C “regardless of whether the 
debtor is subject to tax on the discharged debt.”  Id. § 1.6050P-1(a)(3).  An identifiable 
event – and consequent obligation to issue a Form 1099-C – arises if a debtor fails to 
make a payment for 36 months.  Id. § 1.6050P-1(b)(2)(i)(H).   
The IRS itself has stated that it “does not view a Form 1099–C as an admission by 
the creditor that it has discharged the debt and can no longer pursue collection.” IRS Info. 
2005–0207, 2005 WL 3561135 (Dec. 30, 2005).  The IRS has explained that the issuance 
a Form 1099–C satisfies statutory and regulatory requirements, neither of which “prohibit 
collection activity after a creditor reports by filing a Form 1099–C.”  IRS Info. 2005–
0208, 2005 WL 3561136 (Dec. 30, 2005).  And while these opinion letters are not 
absolutely binding on courts, they are “entitled to respect.”  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
Likewise, the majority of courts to consider the issue have held that a 1099-C does 
not constitute an actual discharge and, where summary judgment is concerned, does not 
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even raise a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in 
favor of the lender.  See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 176 
(4th Cir. 2013); Ware v. Bank of Am. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2014); 
In re Riley, 478 B.R. 736, 744 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2012); Bononi v. Bayer Employees Fed. 
Credit Union (In re Zilka), 407 B.R. 684, 689 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2009). 
Given the nature and purpose of a Form 1099-C, the 1099-C issued to Crapo does 
not constitute evidence of inconsistent conduct by Zions, with or without the additional 
facts raised by Crapo. 
B.  Crapo Did Not Present Other Evidence That Zions Acted 
Inconsistently. 
The first element of equitable estoppel – i.e., that the plaintiff previously 
committed an act or omission inconsistent with a later claim – “is met only when the 
party sought to be estopped has intentionally or through culpable negligence induced the 
other party to change its position by relying on the inconsistent act.”  Big Ditch 
Irrigation, 2011 UT 33, ¶ 42.  On appeal, Crapo argues there were three inconsistent 
acts/omissions that raise a genuine issue of fact regarding estoppel: (i) Zions’ purported 
delay in enforcing the Note; (ii) the phrase in the 1099-C “FORGIVEN DEBT AMT 3 
YRS NO PAYMENT”; and (iii) Zions’ internal Charge Off Request. 39  However, these 
arguments fail because Crapo did not submit evidence that he relied on these actions.   
Reliance is an essential element of equitable estoppel, CECO Corp., 772 P.2d at 
969–70.  Therefore, any allegedly inconsistent acts without reliance cannot support an 
                                
39 Brief of Appellant at 6. 
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estoppel claim.  In Crapo’s summary judgment opposition, the only evidence proffered of 
reliance was Crapo’s purported reliance on “the instructions in the 1099-C.”40  Though 
Crapo’s opposition memorandum was somewhat vague about the acts on which he 
relied,41 Crapo’s supporting declaration clearly limited his reliance to “the instructions in 
the 1099-C.”42  Thus, even to the extent that Crapo argued there were other inconsistent 
acts or omissions, such inconsistencies were irrelevant without evidence of reliance.  See 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) (noting that factual assertions must be supported by citing to 
relevant portions of the record).  Having failed to support his summary judgment 
opposition with evidence that he relied on anything other than “the instructions in the 
1099-C,” Crapo cannot claim on appeal that there were other grounds for estoppel.  See 
Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization, 2012 UT 4, ¶ 31, 270 P.3d 441 
(“[I]n reviewing the material facts on appeal, we are limited to the facts as provided in 
the record.”).  Cf. Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Utah 1988) 
(“Even if the Bank’s silence could be construed as a representation that the Bank was not 
                                
40 R. at 403, ¶ 7 (emphasis added).  Despite that this was the only evidence of reliance, 
the 1099-C instructions are conspicuously absent from Crapo’s argument regarding 
estoppel, and Crapo has apparently abandoned this aspect of his estoppel argument.  See 
Brief of Appellant at 6–8. 
41 R. at 385, ¶ 11 (“As a result, Crapo included the full $250,000.00 value of the Loan as 
income in his 2013 tax return.”).  The paragraph immediately preceding the phrase “As a 
result,” discusses the 1099-C instructions about reporting discharged debts. R. at 385, ¶ 
10.  Thus, the most plausible textual interpretation of “As a result” is to infer “As a result 
of the instructions in the 1099-C . . . ,” which would be consistent with Crapo’s 
declaration.  
42 R. at 403, ¶ 7 (“Following the instructions in the 1099-C, I included the full 
$250,000.00 value of the loan in my gross income for the tax year 2013.”).  
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claiming the fees expended in defending the earlier actions, there is no finding or 
evidence to indicate any reliance on such a representation. “). 
Even if Crapo had presented evidence of reliance, none of the acts or omissions 
argued by Crapo was inconsistent with Zions’ intent to enforce the Note.  First, as a 
matter of law, Zions’ purported delay in enforcing the Note cannot be the basis of 
estoppel because Zions had no legal duty to act before the statute of limitations expired.  
See First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980) (“[I]n order for silence to 
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to speak, or there must be something willful 
or culpable in the silence which allows another to place himself in an unfavorable 
position by reason thereof.” (citation omitted)).  In this case, Crapo specifically agreed 
that Zions could delay enforcement of the Note without losing the right to enforce the 
Note in the future.43  Given this express agreement, the alleged delay was not 
inconsistent with Zions’ right to enforce the Note at a later time. 
Second, while the cryptic phrase “FORGIVEN DEBT AMT” might, if used in 
another context, be interpreted as actual forgiveness, the context it was used in this case 
precludes any such construction.  The words immediately following “FORGIVEN DEBT 
AMT” were “3 YRS NO PAYMENT” – a phrase consistent with the identifiable event 
code “H” included on the form, and which was defined by the IRS in Form 1099-C 
instructions and pertinent regulations as “Expiration of nonpayment testing period.”44  As 
                                
43 R. at 288 
44 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3); R. at 462. 
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recognized by the trial court, the “forgiven debt” language, when viewed in context, does 
not evidence actual discharge of a debt, but is “a reference to the testing period in 
Identifiable Event Code H.”45   
Third, Zions’ internal Charge Off Request is clearly not inconsistent with its intent 
to enforce the Note.  As Crapo himself acknowledges, the document expressly states that 
the loan be “transferred to Recovery Department for further collection efforts” and that 
Zions would search for assets to satisfy a judgment.46  Moreover, a “charge off” is a tax 
and bank regulatory action that does not constitute or evidence a discharge.  Federal tax 
code and regulations permit creditors to claim a deduction by charging off bad debts.  See 
26 U.S.C. § 166; 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-1.  With respect to regulated financial institutions, 
federal agencies have promulgated rules mandating that such institutions charge off debt 
within certain time frames.  See Uniform Retail Credit Classification and Account 
Management Policy, 65 Fed. Reg. 36903-01 (June 12, 2000).  Accordingly, Utah courts 
have recognized that a charge off does not have any legal impact on a debtor’s liability.  
See Sell v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 2007 UT App 316, 2007 WL 2793249 (unpublished) 
(“The fact that a creditor charges off a debt for tax purposes has no effect on a debtor’s 
liability.”).  As also recognized in the Sell opinion, a creditor who later recovers a 
charged off debt is required to treat the recovery “as new taxable income in the year it is 
                                
45 Ruling at 9 (R. at 562; Addendum 5). 
46 R. at 384, 428 (Appellant’s Addendum 2).   
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collected.”  Id.; accord, e.g., Hillsboro Nat. Bank v. C.I.R., 460 U.S. 370, 377–79 (1983); 
In re Zilka, 407 B.R. at 691. 
In short, the inconsistent conduct of which Crapo complains cannot form the basis 
for estoppel because Crapo presented no evidence to the trial court that he relied on such 
conduct.  While Crapo “[f]ollow[ed] the instructions in the 1099-C,” there was no 
evidence that he relied on anything other than those instructions.  In any event, none of 
the conduct identified by Crapo was inconsistent with Zions’ intent to enforce the Note. 
C.  Crapo Did Not Present Evidence of Reasonable Reliance on an 
Inconsistent Act or Omission. 
Crapo argues that in reliance on Zions’ purportedly inconsistent acts and 
omissions, he “included the full value of the Note in his income for the tax year 2013.”47  
However, the only evidence that Crapo presented to support this contention was his own 
declaration testimony.48  As Zions pointed out in its reply memorandum,49 unless an 
exception applies, an original writing or duplicate is required to prove the content of a 
document.  UTAH R. EVID. 1002, 1003.  Crapo’s testimony about the content of his 2013 
tax return is therefore not admissible to prove the contents thereof.   While acts 
independent of a writing are not subject to the original writing rule, testimony as to what 
is reported in a tax return filing necessarily describes the contents of the actual return.  
                                
47 Brief of Appellant at 7. 
48 R. at 385, 403. 
49 R. at 460.  The trial court did not rule on Zions’ objection, but instead found that 
Crapo’s purported reliance was unreasonable.  R. at 567–568.  However, this Court may 
affirm the trial court’s judgment based on any grounds apparent from the record.  Bailey 
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1158. 
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Having failed to produce the actual form on which income is reported, and having failed 
to establish any applicable exception, Crapo cannot testify as to what he did or did not 
report in his 2013 tax return.   
Even if Crapo’s testimony were accepted as admissible evidence, his alleged 
reliance was not reasonable as a matter of law.  While the question of reasonable reliance 
is generally an issue of fact, “there are instances where courts may conclude that as a 
matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance.”  Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996).  In particular, “a party cannot reasonably rely upon 
oral statements by the opposing party in light of contrary written information.”  Id. at 
1068.   
In this case, Crapo cannot have reasonably relied on Zions’ conduct in reporting 
his debt on his tax return.  First, given Crapo’s express agreement that delay did not 
constitute waiver, he cannot have reasonably relied on Zions’ forbearance in enforcing 
the Note.  Even without Crapo’s no-waiver agreement, there was no logical reason for 
him to assume he was forgiven merely because Zions waited to commence enforcement 
action.  Zions had no duty to commence action prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations, and Crapo cannot have reasonably relied on any purported delay.  See RJW 
Media, Inc. v. CIT Grp./Consumer Fin., Inc., 2008 UT App 476, ¶ 34, 202 P.3d 291 
(“Because CIT had no duty to inform RJW of a possible procedural defect, not only was 
it unreasonable for RJW to rely on CIT’s silence, but CIT’s silence cannot be construed 
as an inconsistent act sufficient to establish an equitable estoppel claim.”). 
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Second, Crapo could not have reasonably relied on the phrase “FORGIVEN 
DEBT AMT” in assuming he was required to report the loan amount on his tax return.  
These words were immediately followed and clarified by the phrase “3 YRS NO 
PAYMENT,” which phrase correlates with the designated “identifiable event.”  The 
“identifiable event” specified in the 1099-C was the “Expiration of nonpayment testing 
period” – an event that does not constitute an actual discharge. Further, the 1099-C 
expressly instructed Crapo not to report the debt until he received an actual discharge.50  
Therefore, any reliance on Crapo’s part was unreasonable as a matter of law.  See Perkins 
v. Great-W. Life Assur. Co., 814 P.2d 1125, 1130–31 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“With 
reasonable diligence, Mrs. Perkins could have easily learned that she was not eligible for 
coverage under Great–West’s insurance policy. Given Mrs. Perkins’ failure to learn the 
terms of her insurance policy, her reliance thereon was not reasonable.”). 
Finally, Crapo could not have reasonably relied on Zions’ Charge Off Request.  
Crapo did not even present evidence that he even discovered the Charge Off Request 
prior to his tax filing, let alone that he relied on it.51  Even assuming he had discovered 
and relied on the document prior to filing his return, nothing in that document even 
remotely indicates that Zions intended to discharge Crapo’s debt.  To the contrary, it 
expressed an unequivocal intent to pursue collection. 
                                
50 1099-C (R. at 308; Addendum 3). 
51 R. at 403, ¶ 7 (noting that Crapo’s tax filing was in reliance on the 1099-C 
instructions). 
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In conclusion, Crapo relied solely on the instructions in the 1099-C, not any of the 
other acts or omissions he now emphasizes on appeal.  Even assuming Crapo had relied 
on such acts in reporting the discharged loan amount, Crapo’s reliance was unreasonable.  
The 1099-C specifically identified the event code for issuance and instructed Crapo to 
report the income only in the event of an actual discharge.  In light of this “contrary 
written information,” Crapo’s purported reliance was unreasonable as a matter of law.  
See Gold Standard, 915 P.2d at 1067. 
D.  Crapo Did Not Present Evidence of the Fact of His Injury, Let Alone 
the Amount. 
Crapo argues that because he reported the discharged debt on his tax return, his 
taxes increased and he “paid taxes on the full value of the Note.”52  As noted above, 
Crapo did not provide his tax return.  He also did not provide any details or calculations 
regarding the allegedly increased tax burden, and such information would be necessary 
for him to prevail on his estoppel claim.  In the context of estoppel, Utah courts have held 
that generalized allegations of injury are insufficient; a party claiming estoppel must 
establish both the fact and amount of injury with some particularity: 
A detriment or damage was suffered by the Lessee due to the 
mistakes in the statements submitted by the Lessor. The 
amount of the damage or detriment is not shown. The 
evidence does not indicate how much less the taxes paid the 
federal and state government would have been had the true 
facts been known. . . .  The damage or detriment caused by 
the change of position on the part of the Lessee is speculative. 
                                
52 Brief of Appellant at 9. 
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I.X.L. Stores Co. v. Success Markets, 97 P.2d 577, 580–81 (1939); accord Whitaker v. 
Utah State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 282, ¶ 28, 191 P.3d 814 (“Had he done so, he says, he 
could have earned an additional $3000 per year working as an appraiser. This 
unsubstantiated allegation, however, is insufficient to establish estoppel.”).  Having failed 
to establish “how much less the taxes paid the federal and state government would have 
been had the true facts been known,” Crapo failed to establish a genuine issue of fact 
concerning injury resulting from his reliance.   
Moreover, estoppel requires injury that directly results from reliance.  Big Ditch 
Irrig. Co., 2011 UT 33, ¶ 41.  Therefore, the party claiming estoppel can obtain relief 
only to the extent of that reliance.  See Bolitho v. East, 143 P. 584, 587 (Utah 1914) (“[I]f 
she was guilty of any conduct which would have created an estoppel against her 
respecting her claim to the horses in question, such an estoppel could not have been 
enforced except to the extent of the rent due under the lease, to wit, $291.87, and accrued 
interest, if any, and not for $943.32 as was done in this action.”).53  In other words, Zions 
could only be estopped from collecting the amount of additional tax liability imposed on 
Crapo, but the rest of the debt would still be enforceable.  While Utah has not decided 
any cases in the particular context of a 1099-C, the Fifth Circuit has explained this 
principle as follows: 
                                
53 While Bolitho was decided more than 100 years ago, it was never overruled.  
Moreover, more recent courts to address the issue have held that equitable estoppel 
applies only to the extent of the claimant’s reliance.  See, e.g., Ogar v. City of Haines, 51 
P.3d 333, 335 (Alaska 2002). 
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Appellant at oral argument advised that it had no objection to 
awarding Dennis Ratliff, John Ratliff, and Truman Smith a 
credit on their liability on the August 1990 judgment to the 
extent of the federal income taxes they paid in reliance on the 
1099As . . . and we thus hold those three appellees are 
entitled to such a credit. Because this is the extent of the 
detriment shown to be suffered by each of these three, none is 
entitled to any further relief or to complete cancellation of the 
indebtedness. 
Long v. Turner, 134 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1998).   
Here, Crapo failed to provide admissible evidence of the fact, let alone the 
amount, of his additional tax burden.  Even accepting Crapo’s allegation that he in fact 
reported the cancelled debt, he still failed to set forth any admissible evidence that he, in 
fact, suffered an injury as a result of reporting that debt.  His declaration includes the 
bald, conclusory statement that his “tax burden increased for that year.”54  However, as in 
I.X.L. Stores, Crapo failed to submit any evidence of what that “burden” was.  He failed 
to set forth both the amount of tax he actually paid (if any) and the amount that he would 
have paid but for reporting the discharged debt (if any). 
Finally, even assuming that Crapo had paid additional taxes as a result of his 
alleged reliance on the 1099-C, there is a three-year deadline to claim an overpayment.  
See 26 U.S.C. § 6511.  The earliest Crapo could have filed a return would have been 
early 2013.  Zions commenced a lawsuit against Crapo in September 2014.  To the extent 
that Crapo reasonably believed he had received an actual discharge, he was clearly 
                                
54 R. at 403 ¶ 8. 
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disabused of that notion when Zions brought suit.  Crapo has presented no reasons why 
he could not have amended his 2013 tax return(s) to exclude the reported loan amount. 
In short, Crapo did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had 
suffered an injury as a result of his reliance on Zions’ conduct. 
II. CRAPO DID NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER ZIONS ACTUALLY EFFECTED A 
DISCHARGE OF CRAPO’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NOTE. 
Independent of estoppel, Crapo suggests that he presented evidence sufficient to 
raise a question of whether Zions had, in fact, discharged his debt.  Crapo suggests that 
the trial court’s judgment rested solely upon Cashion, without accounting for the 
additional “contextual clues” raised by Crapo.  Contrary to Crapo’s suggestion, the trial 
court expressly addressed each fact raised by Crapo and included an entire section in its 
Ruling entitled “Analysis of Other Evidence to Determine Whether a Discharge 
Occurred.”55  In any event, none of the evidence presented by Crapo indicated that an 
actual discharge had occurred. 
Generally, any evidence that Crapo presented was irrelevant to the issue of actual 
discharge because Utah law requires that a discharge of a loan (by a financial institution) 
be evidenced by a signed agreement.  Under the statute of frauds, “every credit 
agreement” is “void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement.”  UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1)(4).  The term “credit agreement” includes an agreement to 
                                
55 Ruling at 7–12 (R. at 560–565; Addendum 5). 
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modify an existing debt.  Id. § 25-5-4(2)(a)(i)(A).  Without a signed agreement, any other 
evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an 
actual discharge.  The 1099-C does not constitute an “agreement,” as it lacks any 
promises or definite terms.  See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ¶ 16, 
94 P.3d 179 (“[A] contract cannot exist without a meeting of the minds on the central 
features of the agreement. . . . which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, 
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.”  (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1981) (explaining 
that to satisfy the statute of frauds, a writing must “state[] with reasonable certainty the 
essential terms of the unperformed promises in the contract”). 
Citing Coulter & Smith Ltd. v. Russell, 1999 UT App 55, ¶ 15 n.2, 976 P.2d 1218, 
Crapo argued in the district court that “a writing may be sufficient even though it is 
cryptic, abbreviated, and incomplete.”56  However, Crapo conspicuously omitted the fact 
that the cited language was preceded and qualified by the following clause: “With ample 
explanation and corroboration to be found in undoubted surrounding circumstances or 
even in accompanying oral testimony . . . .”  In other words, a cryptic writing may be 
sufficient, but only where it is accompanied by corroborating evidence and explanation.  
In this case, Crapo did not even attempt to establish that he had, in fact, reached an 
agreement with Zions to discharge his debt.  The 1099-C itself stated no unperformed 
promises or even past consideration given in exchange for the discharge.  Further, it 
                                
56 R. at 514. 
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expressly identified its reason for issuance as expiration of the non-payment testing 
period.  The 1099-C was not a “note or memorandum of [an] agreement,” but was a 
report that was required by law due to Crapo’s failure to make payments for 36 
consecutive months. 
Crapo also cited Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nicholas, 812 A.2d 51, 61 (Conn. 
Ct. App. 2002), for the proposition that the 1099-C was a sufficient writing.57  However, 
that case addressed only whether a Form 1099-C is a signed writing and did not address 
the sufficiency of its terms.  See id. at 60 (“In the case before this court, the plaintiff does 
not deny that the form 1099–C was sent to the defendant. It claims, however, that the 
defendant has not proved that form 1099–C was a signed writing.”). 
Even if the 1099-C satisfied the statute of frauds, the other “contextual clues” cited 
by Crapo did not raise a genuine issue of material fact.  First, the words “FORGIVEN 
DEBT” were followed by the phrase “3 YRS NO PAYMENT,” and further put into 
context with the identified event code “H”, which is expiration of the non-payment 
testing period.  Additionally, Zions submitted unrebutted testimony that the “forgiven 
debt” language was used “not because of an actual forgiveness or discharge, but simply 
as another description of the 36-month testing period without receiving a payment.”58   
Second, the internal Charge Off Request in no way evidenced a discharge.  It expressly 
evidenced the fact that Zions intended to collect the debt; part of the request was for the 
                                
57 R. at 515. 
58 R. at 477, ¶ 5. 
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debt to be transferred to “Recovery Department for further collection efforts.”59  Finally, 
the alleged shifting of tax burdens does not evidence an actual discharge.  Again, the 
reason the 1099-C was issued was expressly identified as an event other than an actual 
discharge. Moreover, Zions is entitled to write off bad debt independent of whether it 
issues a Form 1099-C.  See 26 U.S.C. § 166; 26 C.F.R. § 1.166-1.  In any event, Crapo 
failed to present competent evidence of shifting tax burdens. 
In sum, the 1099-C, even in light of other facts identified by Crapo, did not 
evidence an actual discharge and did not preclude summary judgment in favor of Zions. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL 
 Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Zions 
requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on appeal.  The basis for this 
request is the Note that is the subject of this action, and on which the district court relied 
in awarding fees and costs.60  Further, because it was “entitled to attorney fees in the trial 
court, [Zions] may also recover [its] reasonable fees incurred on appeal.”  Hahnel v. 
Duchesne Land, LC, 2013 UT App 150, ¶ 22, 305 P.3d 208. 
  
                                
59 R. at 428 (Appellant’s Addendum 2). 
60 See Note at 5 (R. at 288); R. at 610–611. 
  
 
 
29 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Crapo failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.  The undisputed evidence 
demonstrated that Crapo received the 1099-C due to his failure to make payments for 36 
months.  Zions’ conduct was not inconsistent with this fact and did not evidence an actual 
discharge.  The judgment of the district court should be affirmed in all respects. 
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of September, 2016 
      BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
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Code of Federal Regulations  
Title 26. Internal Revenue 
Chapter I. Internal Revenue Service, Department of the Treasury 
Subchapter A. Income Tax 
Part 1. Income Taxes (Refs & Annos) 
Procedure and Administration 
Information and Returns 
Returns and Records (Refs & Annos) 
Information Returns 
26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P–1, Treas. Reg. § 1.6050P–1 
§ 1.6050P–1 Information reporting for discharges of indebtedness by certain entities. 
Effective: July 15, 2014 
Currentness 
 
 
(a) Reporting requirement—(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, any applicable entity (as 
defined in section 6050P(c)(1)) that discharges an indebtedness of any person (within the meaning of section 7701(a)(1)) of 
at least $600 during a calendar year must file an information return on Form 1099–C with the Internal Revenue Service. 
Solely for purposes of the reporting requirements of section 6050P and this section, a discharge of indebtedness is deemed to 
have occurred, except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, if and only if there has occurred an identifiable event 
described in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, whether or not an actual discharge of indebtedness has occurred on or before the 
date on which the identifiable event has occurred. The return must include the following information— 
  
 
(i) The name, address, and taxpayer identification number (TIN), as defined in section 7701(a)(41), of each person for 
which there was an identifiable event during the calendar year; 
  
 
(ii) The date on which the identifiable event occurred, as described in paragraph (b) of this section; 
  
 
(iii) The amount of indebtedness discharged, as described in paragraph (c) of this section; 
  
 
(iv) An indication whether the identifiable event was a discharge of indebtedness in a bankruptcy, if known; and 
  
 
(v) Any other information required by Form 1099–C or its instructions, or current revenue procedures. 
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(2) No aggregation. For purposes of reporting under this section, multiple discharges of indebtedness of less than $600 
are not required to be aggregated unless such separate discharges are pursuant to a plan to evade the reporting 
requirements of this section. 
  
 
(3) Amounts not includible in income. Except as otherwise provided in this section, discharged indebtedness must be 
reported regardless of whether the debtor is subject to tax on the discharged debt under sections 61 and 108 or otherwise 
by applicable law. 
  
 
(4) Time and place for reporting—(i) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(4)(ii) of this section, returns 
required by this section must be filed with the Internal Revenue Service office designated in the instructions for Form 
1099–C on or before February 28 (March 31 if filed electronically) of the year following the calendar year in which the 
identifiable event occurs. 
  
 
(ii) Indebtedness discharged in bankruptcy. Indebtedness discharged in bankruptcy that is required to be reported 
under this section must be reported for the later of the calendar year in which the amount of discharged indebtedness 
first becomes ascertainable, or the calendar year in which the identifiable event occurs. 
  
 
(b) Date of discharge—(1) In general. Solely for purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section, indebtedness is discharged on the date of the occurrence of an identifiable event specified in paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section. 
  
 
(2) Identifiable events—(i) In general. An identifiable event is— 
  
 
(A) A discharge of indebtedness under title 11 of the United States Code (bankruptcy); 
  
 
(B) A cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness that renders a debt unenforceable in a receivership, 
foreclosure, or similar proceeding in a federal or State court, as described in section 368(a)(3)(A)(ii) (other than a 
discharge described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(A) of this section); 
  
 
(C) A cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness upon the expiration of the statute of limitations for 
collection of an indebtedness, subject to the limitations described in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section, or upon the 
expiration of a statutory period for filing a claim or commencing a deficiency judgment proceeding; 
  
 
(D) A cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness pursuant to an election of foreclosure remedies by a 
creditor that statutorily extinguishes or bars the creditor’s right to pursue collection of the indebtedness; 
§ 1.6050P–1 Information reporting for discharges of..., 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P–1  
 
 
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
 
  
 
(E) A cancellation or extinguishment of an indebtedness that renders a debt unenforceable pursuant to a probate or 
similar proceeding; 
  
 
(F) A discharge of indebtedness pursuant to an agreement between an applicable entity and a debtor to discharge 
indebtedness at less than full consideration; 
  
 
(G) A discharge of indebtedness pursuant to a decision by the creditor, or the application of a defined policy of the 
creditor, to discontinue collection activity and discharge debt; or 
  
 
(H) In the case of an entity described in section 6050P(c)(2)(A) through (C), the expiration of the non-payment 
testing period, as described in § 1.6050P–1(b)(2)(iv). 
  
 
(ii) Statute of limitations. In the case of an expiration of the statute of limitations for collection of an indebtedness, an 
identifiable event occurs under paragraph (b)(2)(i)(C) of this section only if, and at such time as, a debtor’s affirmative 
statute of limitations defense is upheld in a final judgment or decision of a judicial proceeding, and the period for 
appealing the judgment or decision has expired. 
  
 
(iii) Decision to discontinue collection activity; creditor’s defined policy. For purposes of the identifiable event 
described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(G) of this section, a creditor’s defined policy includes both a written policy of the 
creditor and the creditor’s established business practice. Thus, for example, a creditor’s established practice to 
discontinue collection activity and abandon debts upon expiration of a particular non-payment period is considered a 
defined policy for purposes of paragraph (b)(2)(i)(G) of this section. 
  
 
(iv) Expiration of non-payment testing period. There is a rebuttable presumption that an identifiable event under 
paragraph (b)(2)(i)(H) of this section has occurred during a calendar year if a creditor has not received a payment on an 
indebtedness at any time during a testing period (as defined in this paragraph (b)(2)(iv)) ending at the close of the year. 
The testing period is a 36–month period increased by the number of calendar months during all or part of which the 
creditor was precluded from engaging in collection activity by a stay in bankruptcy or similar bar under state or local 
law. The presumption that an identifiable event has occurred may be rebutted by the creditor if the creditor (or a 
third-party collection agency on behalf of the creditor) has engaged in significant, bona fide collection activity at any 
time during the 12–month period ending at the close of the calendar year, or if facts and circumstances existing as of 
January 31 of the calendar year following expiration of the 36–month period indicate that the indebtedness has not been 
discharged. For purposes of this paragraph (b)(2)(iv)— 
  
 
(A) Significant, bona fide collection activity does not include merely nominal or ministerial collection action, such 
as an automated mailing; 
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(B) Facts and circumstances indicating that an indebtedness has not been discharged include the existence of a lien 
relating to the indebtedness against the debtor (to the extent of the value of the security), or the sale or packaging 
for sale of the indebtedness by the creditor; and 
  
 
(C) In no event will an identifiable event described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(H) of this section occur prior to 
December 31, 1997. 
  
 
(v) Special rule for certain entities required to file in a year prior to 2008. In the case of an entity described in 
section 6050P(c)(1)(A) or (c)(2)(D) required to file an information return in a tax year prior to 2008 due to an 
identifiable event described in paragraph (b)(2)(i)(H) of this section, and who failed to so file, the date of discharge is 
the first event, if any, described in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)(A) through (G) of this section that occurs after 2007. 
  
 
(3) Permitted reporting. If a discharge of indebtedness occurs before the date on which an identifiable event occurs, 
the discharge may, at the creditor’s discretion, be reported under this section. 
  
 
(c) Indebtedness. For purposes of this section and § 1.6050P–2, indebtedness means any amount owed to an applicable 
entity, including stated principal, fees, stated interest, penalties, administrative costs and fines. The amount of indebtedness 
discharged may represent all, or only a part, of the total amount owed to the applicable entity. 
  
 
(d) Exceptions from reporting requirement—(1) Certain bankruptcy discharges—(i) In general. Reporting is required 
under this section in the case of a discharge of indebtedness in bankruptcy only if the creditor knows from information 
included in the reporting entity’s books and records pertaining to the indebtedness that the debt was incurred for business or 
investment purposes as defined in paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section. 
  
 
(ii) Business or investment debt. Indebtedness is considered incurred for business purposes if it is incurred in 
connection with the conduct of any trade or business other than the trade or business of performing services as an 
employee. Indebtedness is considered incurred for investment purposes if it is incurred to purchase property held for 
investment, as defined in section 163(d)(5). 
  
 
(2) Interest. The discharge of an amount of indebtedness that is interest is not required to be reported under this section. 
  
 
(3) Non-principal amounts in lending transactions. In the case of a lending transaction, the discharge of an amount 
other than stated principal is not required to be reported under this section. For this purpose, a lending transaction is any 
transaction in which a lender loans money to, or makes advances on behalf of, a borrower (including revolving credits 
and lines of credit). 
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(4) Indebtedness of foreign debtors held by foreign branches of U.S. financial institutions—(i) Reporting 
requirements. [Reserved] 
  
 
(ii) Definition. An indebtedness held by a foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution is described in this paragraph 
(d)(4) only if— 
  
 
(A) The financial institution is engaged through a branch or office in the active conduct of a banking or similar 
business outside the United States; 
  
 
(B) The branch or office is a permanent place of business that is regularly maintained, occupied, and used to carry 
on a banking or similar financial business; 
  
 
(C) The business is conducted by at least one employee of the branch or office who is regularly in attendance at 
such place of business during normal working hours; 
  
 
(D) The indebtedness is extended outside of the United States by the branch or office in connection with that trade 
or business; and 
  
 
(E) The financial institution does not know or have reason to know that the debtor is a United States person. 
  
 
(5) Acquisition of indebtedness by related party. No reporting is required under this section in the case of a deemed 
discharge of indebtedness under section 108(e)(4) (relating to the acquisition of an indebtedness by a person related to 
the debtor), unless the disposition of the indebtedness by the creditor was made with a view to avoiding the reporting 
requirements of this section. 
  
 
(6) Releases. The release of a co-obligor is not required to be reported under this section if the remaining debtors remain 
liable for the full amount of any unpaid indebtedness. 
  
 
(7) Guarantors and sureties. Solely for purposes of the reporting requirements of this section, a guarantor is not a 
debtor. Thus, in the case of guaranteed indebtedness, reporting under this section is not required with respect to a 
guarantor, whether or not there has been a default and demand for payment made upon the guarantor. 
  
 
(e) Additional rules—(1) Multiple debtors—(i) In general. In the case of indebtedness of $10,000 or more incurred on or 
after January 1, 1995, that involves more than one debtor, a reporting entity is subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) of 
§ 1.6050P–1 Information reporting for discharges of..., 26 C.F.R. § 1.6050P–1  
 
 
 © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
 
this section for each debtor discharged from such indebtedness. In the case of indebtedness incurred prior to January 1, 1995, 
and indebtedness of less than $10,000 incurred on or after January 1, 1995, involving multiple debtors, reporting under this 
section is required only with respect to the primary (or first-named) debtor. Additionally, only one return of information is 
required under this section if the reporting entity knows, or has reason to know, that co-obligors were husband and wife 
living at the same address when an indebtedness was incurred, and does not know or have reason to know that such 
circumstances have changed at the date of a discharge of the indebtedness. This paragraph (e)(1) applies to discharges of 
indebtedness after December 31, 1994. 
  
 
(ii) Amount to be reported. In the case of multiple debtors jointly and severally liable on an indebtedness, the amount 
of discharged indebtedness required to be reported under this section with respect to each debtor is the total amount of 
indebtedness discharged. For this purpose, multiple debtors are presumed to be jointly and severally liable on an 
indebtedness in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
  
 
(2) Multiple creditors—(i) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (e)(2), if indebtedness is owned 
(or treated as owned for federal income tax purposes) by more than one creditor, each creditor that is an applicable entity 
must comply with the reporting requirements of this section with respect to any discharge of indebtedness of $600 or 
more allocable to such creditor. A creditor will be considered to have complied with the requirements of this section if a 
lead bank, fund administrator, or other designee of the creditor complies on its behalf in any reasonable manner, such as 
by filing a single return reporting the aggregate amount of indebtedness discharged, or by filing a return with respect to 
the portion of the discharged indebtedness allocable to the creditor. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2)(i), any 
reasonable method may be used to determine the portion of discharged indebtedness allocable to each creditor. 
  
 
(ii) Partnerships. For purposes of paragraph (e)(2)(i) of this section, indebtedness owned by a partnership is treated as 
owned by the partners. 
  
 
(iii) Pass-through securitized indebtedness arrangement—(A) Reporting requirements. [Reserved] 
  
 
(B) Definition. For purposes of this paragraph (e)(2)(iii), a pass-through securitized indebtedness arrangement is 
any arrangement whereby one or more debt obligations are pooled and held for twenty or more persons whose 
interests in the debt obligations are undivided co-ownership interests that are freely transferrable. Co-ownership 
interests that are actively traded personal property (as defined in § 1.1092(d)–1) are presumed to be freely 
transferrable and held by twenty or more persons. 
  
 
(iv) REMICs. [Reserved] 
  
 
(v) No double reporting. If multiple creditors are considered to hold interests in an indebtedness for purposes of this 
paragraph (e)(2) by virtue of holding ownership interests in an entity, and the entity is required to report a discharge of 
that indebtedness under paragraph (e)(5) of this section, then the multiple creditors are not required to report the 
discharge of indebtedness. 
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(3) Coordination with reporting under section 6050J. If, in the same calendar year, a discharge of indebtedness 
reportable under section 6050P occurs in connection with a transaction also reportable under section 6050J (relating to 
foreclosures and abandonments of secured property), an applicable entity need not file both a Form 1099–A and a Form 
1099–C with respect to the same debtor. The filing requirements of section 6050J will be satisfied with respect to a 
borrower if, in lieu of filing Form 1099–A, a Form 1099–C is filed in accordance with the instructions for the filing of 
that form. This paragraph (e)(3) applies to discharges of indebtedness after December 31, 1994. 
  
 
(4) Direct or indirect subsidiary. For purposes of section 6050P(c)(2)(C), the term direct or indirect subsidiary means 
a corporation in a chain of corporations beginning with an entity described in section 6050P(c)(2)(A), if at least 50 
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 percent of the total value 
of all classes of stock, of such corporation is directly owned by the entity described in section 6050P(c)(2)(A), or by one 
or more other corporations in the chain. 
  
 
(5) Entity formed or availed of to hold indebtedness. Notwithstanding § 1.6050P–2(b)(3), if an entity (the transferee 
entity) is formed or availed of by an applicable entity (within the meaning of section 6050P(c)(1)) for the principal 
purpose of holding indebtedness acquired (including originated) by the applicable entity, then, for purposes of section 
6050P(c)(2)(D), the transferee entity has a significant trade or business of lending money. 
  
 
(6) Use of magnetic media. Any return required under this section must be filed on magnetic media to the extent 
required by section 6011(e) and the regulations thereunder. A failure to file on magnetic media when required 
constitutes a failure to file an information return under section 6721. Any person not required by section 6011(e) to file 
returns on magnetic media may request permission to do so under applicable regulations and revenue procedures. 
  
 
(7) TIN solicitation requirement—(i) In general. For purposes of reporting under this section, a reasonable effort must 
be made to obtain the correct name/taxpayer identification number (TIN) combination of a person whose indebtedness is 
discharged. A TIN obtained at the time an indebtedness is incurred satisfies the requirement of this section, unless the 
entity required to file knows that such TIN is incorrect. If the TIN is not obtained prior to the occurrence of an 
identifiable event, it must be requested of the debtor for purposes of satisfying the requirement of this paragraph (e)(7). 
  
 
(ii) Manner of soliciting TIN. Solicitations made in the manner described in § 301.6724–1(e)(1)(i) and (2) of this 
chapter will be deemed to have satisfied the reasonable effort requirement set forth in paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section. 
A TIN solicitation made after the occurrence of an identifiable event must clearly notify the debtor that the Internal 
Revenue Service requires the debtor to furnish its TIN, and that failure to furnish such TIN may subject the debtor to a 
$50 penalty imposed by the Internal Revenue Service. A TIN provided under this section is not required to be certified 
under penalties of perjury. 
  
 
(8) Recordkeeping requirements. Any applicable entity required to file a return with the Internal Revenue Service 
under this section must also retain a copy of the return, or have the ability to reconstruct the data required to be included 
on the return under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, for at least four years from the date such return is required to be filed 
under paragraph (a)(4) of this section. 
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(9) No multiple reporting. If discharged indebtedness is reported under this section, no further reporting under this 
section is required for the amount so reported, notwithstanding that a subsequent identifiable event occurs with respect 
to the same amount. Further, no additional reporting or Form 1099–C correction is required if a creditor receives a 
payment of all or a portion of a discharged indebtedness reported under this section for a prior calendar year. 
  
 
(f) Requirement to furnish statement—(1) In general. Any applicable entity required to file a return under this section 
must furnish to each person whose name is shown on such return a written statement that includes the following 
information— 
  
 
(i) The information required by paragraph (a)(1) of this section. An IRS truncated taxpayer identifying number (TTIN) 
may be used as the TIN of the person for whom there was an identifiable event in lieu of the identifying number 
appearing on the information return filed with the Internal Revenue Service. For provisions relating to the use of TTINs, 
see § 301.6109–4 of this chapter (Procedure and Administration Regulations); 
  
 
(ii) The name, address, and TIN of the applicable entity required to file a return under paragraph (a) of this section; 
  
 
(iii) A legend identifying the statement as important tax information that is being furnished to the Internal Revenue 
Service; and 
  
 
(iv) Any other information required by Form 1099–C or its instructions, or current revenue procedures. 
  
 
(2) Furnishing copy of Form 1099–C. The requirement to provide a statement to the debtor will be satisfied if the 
applicable entity furnishes copy B of the Form 1099–C or a substitute statement that complies with the requirements of 
the current revenue procedure for substitute Forms 1099. 
  
 
(3) Time and place for furnishing statement. The statement required by this paragraph (f) must be furnished to the 
debtor on or before January 31 of the year following the calendar year in which the identifiable event occurs. The 
statement will be considered furnished to the debtor if it is mailed to the debtor’s last known address. 
  
 
(g) Penalties. For penalties for failure to comply with the requirements of this section, see sections 6721 through 6724. 
  
 
(h) Effective/applicability date. This section applies to discharges of indebtedness after December 31, 2013. For discharges 
of indebtedness before January 1, 2014, § 1.6050P–1 (as contained in 26 CFR part 1, revised April 2013) shall apply. 
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2015Instructions for Forms 1099-A and 1099-C
Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property and Cancellation of Debt
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service
Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code unless otherwise noted.
Future Developments
For the latest information about developments related to Forms 1099-A and 1099-C and their instructions, such as legislation enacted after they were published, go to www.irs.gov/form1099a and www.irs.gov/form1099c.
What's New
At the time these instructions went to print Proposed Regulations (REG-136676-13) were issued concerning the 36-month non-payment testing period. See, www.irs.gov/form1099a for further developments.
Reminder
In addition to these specific instructions, you should also use the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns (Forms 1097, 1098, 1099, 3921, 3922, 5498, and W-2G). Those general instructions include information about the following topics.
Who must file (nominee/middleman).
When and where to file.
Electronic reporting requirements.
Corrected and void returns.
Statements to recipients.
Taxpayer identification numbers.
Backup withholding.
Penalties.
Other general topics.
You can get the general instructions from www.irs.gov/form1099a or www.irs.gov/form1099c or by calling 1-800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676).
Specific Instructions for Form 1099-A
File Form 1099-A, Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property, for each borrower if you lend money in connection with your trade or business and, in full or partial satisfaction of the debt, you acquire an interest in property that is security for the debt, or you have reason to know that the property has been abandoned. You need not be in the business of lending money to be subject to this reporting requirement.
Coordination With Form 1099-C
If, in the same calendar year, you cancel a debt of $600 or more in connection with a foreclosure or abandonment of secured property, it is not necessary to file both Form 1099-A and Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, for the same debtor. You may file Form 1099-C only. You will meet your Form 1099-A filing requirement for the debtor by completing boxes 4, 5, and 7 on Form 1099-C. 
However, if you file both Forms 1099-A and 1099-C, do not complete boxes 4, 5, or 7 on Form 1099-C. See the instructions for Form 1099-C, later.
Property
Property means any real property (such as a personal residence), any intangible property, and tangible personal property except:
No reporting is required for tangible personal property (such as a car) held only for personal use. However, you must file Form 1099-A if the property is totally or partly held for use in a trade or business or for investment.
No reporting is required if the property securing the loan is located outside the United States and the borrower has furnished the lender a statement, under penalties of perjury, that the borrower is an exempt foreign person (unless the lender knows that the statement is false).
Who Must File
In addition to the general rule specified above, the following rules apply.
Multiple owners of a single loan. If there are multiple owners of undivided interests in a single loan, such as in pools, fixed investment trusts, or other similar arrangements, the trustee, record owner, or person acting in a similar capacity must file Form 1099-A on behalf of all the owners of beneficial interests or participations. In this case, only one form for each borrower must be filed on behalf of all owners with respect to the loan. Similarly, for bond issues, only the trustee or similar person is required to report.
Governmental unit. A governmental unit, or any of its subsidiary agencies, that lends money secured by property must file Form 1099-A.
Subsequent holder. A subsequent holder of a loan is treated as a lender and is required to report events occurring after the loan is transferred to the new holder.
Multiple lenders. If more than one person lends money secured by property and one lender forecloses or otherwise acquires an interest in the property and the sale or other acquisition terminates, reduces, or otherwise impairs the other lenders' security interests in the property, the other lenders must file Form 1099-A for each of their loans. For example, if a first trust holder forecloses on a building, and the second trust holder knows or has reason to know of such foreclosure, the second trust holder must file Form 1099-A for the second trust even though no part of the second trust was satisfied by the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.
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Abandonment
An abandonment occurs when the objective facts and circumstances indicate that the borrower intended to and has permanently discarded the property from use. You have “reason to know” of an abandonment based on all the facts and circumstances concerning the status of the property. You will be deemed to know all the information that would have been discovered through a reasonable inquiry when, in the ordinary course of business, you become aware or should become aware of circumstances indicating that the property has been abandoned. If you expect to commence a foreclosure, execution, or similar sale within 3 months of the date you had reason to know that the property was abandoned, reporting is required as of the date you acquire an interest in the property or a third party purchases the property at such sale. If you expect to but do not commence such action within 3 months, the reporting requirement arises at the end of the 3-month period.
Statements to Borrowers
If you are required to file Form 1099-A, you must provide a statement to the borrower. Furnish a copy of Form 1099-A or an acceptable substitute statement to each borrower. For more information about the requirement to furnish a statement to the borrower, see part M in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns.
Truncating Borrower's identification number onstatements. Pursuant to Treasury Regulations section 301.6109-4, all filers of Form 1099-A may truncate a borrower's identification number (social security number (SSN), individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN), adoption taxpayer identification number (ATIN), or employer identification number (EIN)) on payee statements. Truncation is not allowed on any documents the filer files with the IRS. A lender's identification number may not be truncated on any form. See part J in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns.
Account Number
The account number is required if you have multiple accounts for a borrower for whom you are filing more than one Form 1099-A. Additionally, the IRS encourages you to designate an account number for all Forms 1099-A that you file. See part L in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns.
Box 1. Date of Lender's Acquisition or 
Knowledge of Abandonment
For an acquisition, enter the date you acquired the secured property. An interest in the property generally is acquired on the earlier of the date title is transferred to the lender or the date possession and the burdens and benefits of ownership are transferred to the lender. If an objection period is provided by law, use the date the objection period expires. If you purchase the property at a sale held to satisfy the debt, such as at a foreclosure or execution sale, use the later of the date of sale or the date the borrower's right of redemption, if any, expires.
For an abandonment, enter the date you knew or had reason to know that the property was abandoned unless you expect to commence a foreclosure, execution, or 
similar action within 3 months, as explained earlier. If a third party purchases the property at a foreclosure, execution, or similar sale, the property is treated as abandoned, and you have reason to know of its abandonment on the date of sale.
Box 2. Balance of Principal Outstanding
Enter the balance of the debt outstanding at the time the interest in the property was acquired or on the date you first knew or had reason to know that the property was abandoned. Include only unpaid principal on the original debt. Do not include accrued interest or foreclosure costs.
Box 3. Reserved
Box 4. Fair Market Value (FMV) of Property
For a foreclosure, execution, or similar sale, enter the FMV of the property. See Temporary Regulations section 1.6050J-1T, Q/A-32. Generally, the gross foreclosure bid price is considered to be the FMV. If an abandonment or voluntary conveyance to the lender in lieu of foreclosure occurred and you placed an “X” in the checkbox in box 5, enter the appraised value of the property. Otherwise, make no entry in this box.
Box 5. Was Borrower Personally Liable for 
Repayment of the Debt
If the borrower was personally liable for repayment of the debt at the time the debt was created or, if modified, at the time of the last modification, enter an “X” in the checkbox.
Box 6. Description of Property
Enter a general description of the property. For real property, generally you must enter the address of the property, or, if the address does not sufficiently identify the property, enter the section, lot, and block.
For personal property, enter the applicable type, make, and model. For example, describe a car as “Car—2011 Honda Accord.” Use a category such as “Office Equipment” to describe more than one piece of personal property, such as six desks and seven computers. Enter “CCC” for crops forfeited on Commodity Credit Corporation loans.
Specific Instructions for Form 1099-C
The creditor's phone number must be provided in the creditor's information box. It should be a central number for all canceled debts at which a person may be reached who will insure the debtor is connected with the correct department.
Do not file Form 1099-C when fraudulent debt is canceled due to identity theft. Form 1099-C is to be used only for cancellations of debts for which the debtor actually incurred the underlying debt.
File Form 1099-C, Cancellation of Debt, for each debtor for whom you canceled a debt owed to you of $600 or more if:
1. You are an entity described under Who Must File, below, and
CAUTION
!
CAUTION
!
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2. An identifiable event has occurred. It does not matter whether the actual cancellation is on or before the date of the identifiable event. See When Is a Debt Canceled, later.
Form 1099-C must be filed regardless of whether the debtor is required to report the debt as income.
The debtor may be an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, estate, association, or company.
Do not combine multiple cancellations of a debt to determine whether you meet the $600 reporting requirement unless the separate cancellations are under a plan to evade the Form 1099-C requirements.
Coordination With Form 1099-A
If, in the same calendar year, you cancel a debt of $600 or more in connection with a foreclosure or abandonment of secured property, it is not necessary to file both Form 1099-A, Acquisition or Abandonment of Secured Property, and Form 1099-C for the same debtor. You may file Form 1099-C only. You will meet your Form 1099-A filing requirement for the debtor by completing boxes 4, 5, and 7 on Form 1099-C. However, you may file both Forms 1099-A and 1099-C; if you do file both forms, do not complete boxes 4, 5, or 7 on Form 1099-C. See the instructions for Form 1099-A, earlier, and Box 4, Box 5, and Box 7, later.
Who Must File
File Form 1099-C if you are:
1. A financial institution described in section 581 or 591(a) (such as a domestic bank, trust company, building and loan or savings and loan association).
2. A credit union.
3. Any of the following, its successor, or subunit of one of the following:
a. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
b. Resolution Trust Corporation,
c. National Credit Union Administration,
d. Any other federal executive agency, including government corporations,
e. Any military department,
f. U.S. Postal Service, or
g. Postal Rate Commission.
4. A corporation that is a subsidiary of a financial institution or credit union, but only if, because of your affiliation, you are subject to supervision and examination by a federal or state regulatory agency.
5. A Federal Government agency including:
a. A department,
b. An agency,
c. A court or court administrative office, or
d. An instrumentality in the judicial or legislative branch of the government.
6. Any organization whose significant trade or business is the lending of money, such as a finance company or credit card company (whether or not affiliated 
CAUTION
!
with a financial institution). The lending of money is a significant trade or business if money is lent on a regular and continuing basis. Regulations section 1.6050P-2(b) lists three safe harbors under which reporting may not be required for the current year. See Safe harbor rules next.
Safe harbor rules. The three safe harbor rules in which an entity will not be considered to have a significant trade or business of lending money are:
1. No prior year reporting required. An organization will not have a significant trade or business of lending money for the current year if the organization was not required to report in the prior year and if its gross income from lending money in the most recent test year (see item 3 below) is less than both 15% of the organization's gross income and $5 million.
2. Prior year reporting requirement. An organization that had a prior year reporting requirement will not have a significant trade or business of lending money for the current year if, for each of the 3 most recent test years, its gross income from lending money is less than both 10% of the organization's gross income and $3 million.
3. No test year. Newly formed organizations are considered not to have a significant trade or business of lending money even if the organization lends money on a regular and continuing basis. However, this safe harbor does not apply to an entity formed or availed of for the principal purpose of holding loans acquired or originated by another entity. In this instance, the transferee entity (including real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) and pass-through securitized indebtedness arrangements) may be required to report cancellation of indebtedness on Form 1099-C. See Regulations section 1.6050P-1(e)(5).
Test year defined.  A test year is a tax year of the organization that ends before July 1 of the previous calendar year. For example, X, a calendar year taxpayer who has a significant trade or business of lending money, is formed in year one. X will not have a test year in year one or year two. However, for year three, X's test year will be year one. In year three, year one is the only year that ended before July 1 of the previous calendar year (in this example, year two).
Penalties. There are penalties for failure to file correct information returns by the due date and for failure to furnish correct payee statements. See part O in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns for details.
Exceptions. Until further guidance is issued, no penalty will apply for failure to file Form 1099-C, or provide statements to debtors, for amounts:
Discharged in nonlending transactions, or
Forgiven pursuant to the terms of a debt obligation.
Multiple creditors. If a debt is owned (or treated as owned for federal income tax purposes) by more than one creditor, each creditor that is described under Who Must File, earlier, must issue a Form 1099-C if that creditor's part of the canceled debt is $600 or more. A creditor will be deemed to have met its filing requirements if a lead bank, fund administrator, or other designee of the creditor complies on its behalf. The designee may file a single 
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Form 1099-C reporting the aggregate canceled debt or may file Form 1099-C for that creditor's part of the canceled debt. Use any reasonable method to determine the amount of each creditor's part of the canceled debt.
Debt owned by a partnership is treated as owned by the partners and must follow the rules for multiple creditors.
Pass-throughs and REMICs. Until further guidance is issued, no penalty will apply for failure to file Form 1099-C, or provide statements to debtors, for a canceled debt held in a pass-through securitized debt arrangement or held by a REMIC. However, see item 3 under Safe harbor rules, earlier.
A pass-through securitized debt arrangement is any arrangement in which one or more debts are pooled and held for 20 or more persons whose interests in the debt are undivided co-ownership interests that are freely transferable. Co-ownership interests that are actively traded personal property (as defined in Regulations section 1.1092(d)-1) are presumed to meet these requirements.
Debt Defined
A debt is any amount owed to you, including stated principal, stated interest, fees, penalties, administrative costs, and fines. The amount of debt canceled may be all or only part of the total amount owed. However, for a lending transaction, you are required to report only the stated principal. See Exceptions, later.
When To File
Generally, file Form 1099-C for the year in which an identifiable event occurs. See Exceptions, later. If you cancel a debt before an identifiable event occurs, you may choose to file Form 1099-C for the year of cancellation. No further reporting is required even if a later identifiable event occurs with respect to an amount previously reported. Also, you are not required to file an additional or corrected Form 1099-C if you receive payment on a prior year debt.
When Is a Debt Canceled
A debt is deemed canceled on the date an identifiable event occurs or, if earlier, the date of the actual discharge if you choose to file Form 1099-C for the year of cancellation. An identifiable event is one of the following.
1. A discharge in bankruptcy under Title 11 of the U.S. Code. For information on certain discharges in bankruptcy not required to be reported, see Exceptions, later. Enter “A” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
2. A cancellation or extinguishment making the debt unenforceable in a receivership, foreclosure, or similar federal nonbankruptcy or state court proceeding. Enter “B” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
3. A cancellation or extinguishment when the statute of limitations for collecting the debt expires, or when the statutory period for filing a claim or beginning a deficiency judgment proceeding expires. Expiration of the statute of limitations is an identifiable event only when a debtor's affirmative statute of limitations defense is upheld in a final 
judgment or decision of a court and the appeal period has expired. Enter “C” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
4. A cancellation or extinguishment when the creditor elects foreclosure remedies that by law extinguish or bar the creditor's right to collect the debt. This event applies to a mortgage lender or holder who is barred by local law from pursuing debt collection after a “power of sale” in the mortgage or deed of trust is exercised. Enter “D” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
5. A cancellation or extinguishment making the debt unenforceable under a probate or similar proceeding. Enter “E” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
6. A discharge of indebtedness under an agreement between the creditor and the debtor to cancel the debt at less than full consideration (for example, short sales). Enter “F” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
7. A discharge of indebtedness because of a decision or a defined policy of the creditor to discontinue collection activity and cancel the debt. A creditor's defined policy can be in writing or an established business practice of the creditor. A creditor's established practice to stop collection activity and abandon a debt when a particular nonpayment period expires is a defined policy. Enter “G” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
8. The expiration of non-payment testing period. This applies only to entities described in numbers 1, 2, 3, or 4 under Who Must File, earlier. This event occurs when the creditor has not received a payment on the debt during the testing period. The testing period is a 36-month period ending on December 31, plus any time when the creditor was precluded from collection activity by a stay in bankruptcy or similar bar under state or local law. Enter “H” in box 6 to report this identifiable event.
The creditor can rebut the occurrence of this identifiable event if:
a. The creditor (or a third party collection agency on behalf of the creditor) has engaged in significant bona fide collection activity during the 12-month period ending on December 31, or
b. Facts and circumstances that exist on January 31 following the end of the 36-month period indicate that the debt was not canceled.
Significant bona fide collection activity does not include nominal or ministerial collection action, such as an automated mailing. Facts and circumstances indicating that a debt was not canceled include the existence of a lien relating to the debt (up to the value of the security) or the sale or packaging for sale of the debt by the creditor.
9. Other actual discharge before identifiable event. Enter “I” in box 6 if there is an other actual discharge before one of the identifiable events listed above.
Exceptions
You are not required to report on Form 1099-C the following.
1. Certain bankruptcies. You are not required to report a debt discharged in bankruptcy unless you know from information included in your books and records that the debt was incurred for business or investment purposes. If 
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you are required to report a business or investment debt discharged in bankruptcy, report it for the later of:
a. The year in which the amount of discharged debt first can be determined, or
b. The year in which the debt is discharged in bankruptcy.
A debt is incurred for business if it is incurred in connection with the conduct of any trade or business other than the trade or business of performing services as an employee. A debt is incurred for investment if it is incurred to purchase property held for investment (as defined in section 163(d)(5)).
2. Interest. You are not required to report interest. However, if you choose to report interest as part of the canceled debt in box 2, you must show the interest separately in box 3.
3. Nonprincipal amounts. Nonprincipal amounts include penalties, fines, fees, and administrative costs. For a lending transaction, you are not required to report any amount other than stated principal. A lending transaction occurs when a lender loans money to, or makes advances on behalf of, a borrower (including revolving credit and lines of credit). For a nonlending transaction, nonprincipal amounts are included in the debt. However, until further guidance is issued, no penalties will be imposed for failure to report these amounts in nonlending transactions.
4. Foreign debtors. Until further guidance is issued, no penalty will apply if a financial institution does not file Form 1099-C for a debt canceled by its foreign branch or foreign office for a foreign debtor, provided all the following apply.
a. The financial institution is engaged in the active conduct of a banking or similar business outside the United States.
b. The branch or office is a permanent place of business that is regularly maintained, occupied, and used to carry on a banking or similar financial business.
c. The business is conducted by at least one employee of the branch or office who is regularly in attendance at the place of business during normal working hours.
d. The indebtedness is extended outside the United States by the branch or office in connection with that trade or business.
e. The financial institution does not know or have reason to know that the debtor is a U.S. person.
5. Related parties. Generally, a creditor is not required to file Form 1099-C for the deemed cancellation of a debt that occurs when the creditor acquires the debt of a related debtor, becomes related to the debtor, or transfers the debt to another creditor related to the debtor. However, if the transfer to a related party by the creditor was for the purpose of avoiding the Form 1099-C requirements, Form 1099-C is required. See section 108(e)(4).
6. Release of a debtor. You are not required to file Form 1099-C if you release one of the debtors on a debt as long as the remaining debtors are liable for the full unpaid amount.
7. Guarantor or surety. You are not required to file Form 1099-C for a guarantor or surety. A guarantor is not a debtor for purposes of filing Form 1099-C even if demand for payment is made to the guarantor.
8. Seller financing. Organizations whose principal trade or business is the sale of non-financial goods or non-financial services, and who extend credit to customers in connection with the purchase of those non-financial goods and non-financial services, are not considered to have a significant trade or business of lending money, with respect to the credit extended in connection with the purchase of those goods or services, for reporting discharge of indebtedness on Form 1099-C. See Regulations section 1.6050P-2(c). But the reporting applies if a separate financing subsidiary of the retailer extends the credit to the retailer's customers.
Multiple Debtors
For debts of $10,000 or more incurred after 1994 that involve debtors who are jointly and severally liable for the debt, you must report the entire amount of the canceled debt on each debtor's Form 1099-C. Multiple debtors are jointly and severally liable for a debt if there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. If it can be shown that joint and several liability does not exist, a Form 1099-C is required for each debtor for whom you canceled a debt of $600 or more.
For debts incurred before 1995 and for debts of less than $10,000 incurred after 1994, you must file Form 1099-C only for the primary (or first-named) debtor.
If you know or have reason to know that the multiple debtors were husband and wife who were living at the same address when the debt was incurred, and you have no information that these circumstances have changed, you may file only one Form 1099-C.
Recordkeeping
If you are required to file Form 1099-C, you must retain a copy of that form or be able to reconstruct the data for at least 4 years from the due date of the return.
Requesting TINs
You must make a reasonable effort to obtain the correct name and taxpayer identification number (TIN) of the person whose debt was canceled. You may obtain the TIN when the debt is incurred. If you do not obtain the TIN before the debt is canceled, you must request the debtor's TIN. Your request must clearly notify the debtor that the IRS requires the debtor to furnish its TIN and that failure to furnish such TIN subjects the debtor to a $50 penalty imposed by the IRS. You may use Form W-9, Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification, to request the TIN. However, a debtor is not required to certify his or her TIN under penalties of perjury.
Statements to Debtors
If you are required to file Form 1099-C, you must provide a statement to the debtor. Furnish a copy of Form 1099-C or an acceptable substitute statement to each debtor. In the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns, see:
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Part M for more information about the requirement to furnish a statement to the debtor, and
Part J for specific procedures to complete Form 1099-C for debtors in bankruptcy.
Truncating Debtor's identification number on payee statements. Pursuant to Treasury Regulations sections 301.6109-4, all filers of Form 1099-C may truncate a debtor's identification number (social security number (SSN), individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN), adoption taxpayer identification number (ATIN), or employer identification number (EIN)) on payee statements. Truncation is not allowed on any documents the filer files with the IRS. A creditor's identification number may not be truncated on any form. See part J in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns.
Account Number
The account number is required if you have multiple accounts for a debtor for whom you are filing more than one Form 1099-C. Additionally, the IRS encourages you to designate an account number for all Forms 1099-C that you file. See part L in the 2015 General Instructions for Certain Information Returns.
Box 1. Date of Identifiable Event
Enter the date of the identifiable event. See When Is a Debt Canceled, earlier. However, if you actually cancel a debt before an identifiable event and you choose to report that cancellation, enter the date that you actually canceled the debt.
Box 2. Amount of Debt Discharged
Enter the amount of the canceled debt. See Debt Defined and Exceptions, earlier. The amount of the canceled debt cannot be greater than the total debt less any amount the lender receives in satisfaction of the debt by means of a settlement agreement, foreclosure sale, a short sale that partially satisfied the debt, etc.
Box 3. Interest if Included in Box 2
Enter any interest you included in the canceled debt in box 2. You are not required to report interest in box 2. But if you do, you must also report it in box 3.
Box 4. Debt Description
Enter a description of the origin of the debt, such as student loan, mortgage, or credit card expenditure. Be as specific as possible. If you are filing a combined Form 1099-C and 1099-A, include a description of the property.
Box 5. Check Here if the Debtor was Personally 
Liable for Repayment of the Debt
If the debtor was personally liable for repayment of the debt at the time the debt was created or, if modified, at the time of the last modification, enter an “X” in the checkbox.
Box 6. Identifiable Event Code
Enter the appropriate code to report the nature of the identifiable event. For more information about the code to use when reporting each identifiable event, see When Is a Debt Canceled, earlier, and Regulations section 1.6050P-1(b)(2). Also see Publication 4681, Canceled Debts, Foreclosures, Repossessions, and Abandonments.
Box 7. Fair Market Value (FMV) of Property
FMV should include the appraised value of the property if the property is sold in a short sale.
If you are filing a combined Form 1099-C and 1099-A for a foreclosure, execution, or similar sale, enter the FMV of the property. Generally, the gross foreclosure bid price is considered to be the FMV. If an abandonment or voluntary conveyance to the lender in lieu of foreclosure occurred, enter the appraised value of the property. 
TIP
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